The participants included Steve Clemons, director of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation (who writes the popular blog Washington Note), and his boss, former Washington Post reporter Steve Coll, who took opposing sides of the issue. The rest of the panelists included several former military men and a former assistant secretary of defense under George W. Bush.
Organized along the lines of a formal Oxford debate, each side was asked to challenge or defend the proposition: American Cannot and Will Not Succeed in Afghanistan/Pakistan. It was testament to the quality of the debaters that at the end, those who argued against the resolution (and for a renewed effort in the region) actually won over a lot of the undecided in the presumably-liberal New York audience.
However, both sides admitted they had a lot in common: neither side wanted a complete U.S. pullout; their disagreement centered on tactics: a continued engagement on a limited scale, more effective counter-insurgency, more focus on economic development. Where they disagreed most sharply was on the effectiveness of the U.S. involvement so far and whether Afghan troops can replace or supplement the U.S. effort. The other unstated agreement was the conceit that America can project its power and intentions while viewing other players as passive or peripheral.
For example, I was disturbed by the lack of focus on what Afghans themselves want and what kind of country they imagine. In fact, some of the discussion was about whether Afghanistan was a country at all or a hopeless collection of disparate tribes and cultures. The other missing element was the role of other players in the region, other than Pakistan. It is hard to imagine a lasting solution without the heavy involvement of Iran and Russia, China and India.
Pakistan got short shrift in the discussion (which the participants admitted toward the end) other than as a safe haven for the Taliban or Al-Quaeda. Yet India, the most economically-successful country in the region hardly came up. One reason Pakistan's intelligence forces have nurtured radicals in Afghanistan and Pakistan is as a sort of buffer against India. Many Pakistani leaders consider India a far greater threat than radical Islam.
While in India last year, I spoke to a former military leader turned entrepreneur about U.S. fears that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal would fall into radical hands. The former officer, drew himself up and said very quietly: "We would never allow that to happen." I shudder to imagine an Indian invasion, or preemptive strike, of Pakistan and the possible impact on the region.
One of the flaws in most discussions about Afghanistan is the persistent myth that the U.S. can still go it alone in foreign policy, a myopia that President Obama,despite his strong internationalist leanings, will have a difficult time changing.Giving the generals what they want, as the right is arguing now, suggests that once more troops are committed we are closer to solving the problem.
But unless we take into account the national interests of Russia, India, Pakistan, and Iraq, and find ways to draw them into a common solution, we face the danger of stepping more deeply into a swamp that has swallowed some of the most powerful armies in the world.
